Equality in Athens: Between Lot and Specialization

Equality in Athens: Between Lot and Specialization
For The Historical Development of Ancient Political Theory
Terese Howard
3/19/10
How can everyone be equal when only a few people know how to run a country? How can anyone know how to run a country when everyone is equal? These questions stab at the core of the tension between striving for equality and striving for excellence in society with which all societies must wrestle. The value of equality comes up against its limitations when faced with the need for specialization that ultimately hinders equality. Specialization can destroy society by taking over the possibility of citizen participation. These conflicts must be addressed in order to find positive uses of both equality and specialization that are not mutually exclusive.

At the heart of early Athenian democratic theory is the idea of equality. The meaning of equality for Athenian democracy is very different, however, than its meaning in modern day democracies. Greek political historian, Paul Cartledge, points out that Greek ideas of equality were not wrapped up in the “liberal sense of the equality of individual rights against the State” (Cartledge, Ancient Greek Political Thought, 7). Greek equality did not separate the individual from the State (as Hobbes does). Because Greek equality did not place the individual in primacy it takes a significantly different form than post-Hobbesian views of equality. Furthermore, the Greeks did not strive for all the same sorts of equality that are sought today. Gender equality, for example, was not a concern for them. Economic equality, though it was a concern to some extent, took a back seat in Greek equality.

The primary focus of Greek equality was civic equality. That is, equality of political participation, or “equality of status and respect within the conceptual framework of the Greeks normative socio-political system” (Cartledge, Ancient Greek Political Thought, 7). This equality is wrestled with in education theory, in political activity, and in choosing political leaders/participants. In this essay I will focus on the later two strata of equality, but I will briefly touch on the significance of education theory for treatments of equality.

The fundamental question of the possibility or impossibly of political equality is at the heart of the question of whether one can teach political virtue. The differing opinions on this question reveal the conflict which arose in Athens over the legitimacy of equality in politics – or, between aristocracy and democracy. For those who believed that political virtue could be taught, people were seen as equally apt for political activity. With Solon the idea arose that political aptitude could be taught to anyone and was not a trait of birth or wealth. Latter others, such as Plato, in opposition to democracy, argued that political aptitude could be taught, but only to the few who were born with that possibility. This disagreement speaks to the vital role which the belief in equality played in democratic theory.

Because people’s equality in civic participation is at the core of Athenian democracy, all methods of reflecting or realizing this equality are central to Athenian democracy as well. One of these means, as mentioned, is the means of education. Another is the legal role which citizens played as council people and jurors. Another is the method of choosing these council people and jurors and other political leaders. Yet another is the roles that people are given in the polis. These social structures and practices reveal how the Athenians dealt with issues of equality or inequality. In what follows I will specifically examine the significance of elections by lot, and the argument for specialization of political roles made by Plato, as a tension between equality and inequality.

The beginning of the use of the lot in electing political participants is heavily debated (Headlam, Election by Lot in Athens) but regardless of the exact date, the shift coincided with the move to democracy. Greek history scholar, Donald Kagan, explains that at this time, “The old magistracies ceased entirely to be elective and were filled by lot” (Kagan, The Great Dialogue, 52). All free male citizens were included in the lot and thus could potentially be chosen for positions of political decision making. Wealth, talent, nor birth were a prerequisite for placement in the lot. In fact, some political positions, such as juror, were paid so that even the poor could take the time away from their work to do this civic duty.

Some scholars down play the significance of the lot as a tool of egalitarian politics arguing,
“when an office such as the Archonship which in earlier times was filled by popular election came to be filled by lot, it ceased to be of any political importance; and hence they conclude that if numerous minor administrative posts were so filled, the custom is curious and rather foolish, it is characteristic of the democratic jealousy, but did not seriously affect the government of the state” (Headlam, Election by Lot in Athens).
While it is true that the shift to using the lot did correspond with the decrease of power associated with roles such as Archon, this does not mean that the lot had no political significance or that the positions filled by lot were insignificant. In fact, it may be argued that with the use of lot, positions of leadership became more significant because the role of governing became a job instead of a birth right. Even though the power of any single one of these political roles decreased as the lot began to be used, the political power was dispersed more throughout all the positions. Athenian political scholar James Headlam argues that downplaying the lot “ignores, what is equally true, that, though no individual office is of particular prominence, the work done by all the officials elected by lot was together of the greatest extent” (Headlam, Election by Lot in Athens). The move to lot was not only a shift from blood, strength, or vote as the deciding method for political positions. It was also a shift to more dispersed political power. No longer was the position of Archon as important because other positions, such as council people, became more significant. Headlam goes on to say,

“It is scarcely too much to say that the whole administration of the state was in the hands of men appointed by lot : the serious work of the law courts, of the execution of the laws, of police, of public finance, in short of every department (with the exception of actual commands in the army) was one by officials so chosen” (Headlam, Election by Lot in Athens).

In this way, the shrinking power of some political positions does not indicate an insignificance of the lot, but instead a growing significance of dispersing the political power throughout more positions and more people.

Furthermore, skeptics of the significance of the lot treat the religious origin of the lot as a reason to disregard its political significance. It is true that the lot has a religious origin, and even that “the great mass of the people firmly believed in the continual intervention of the Gods in the affairs of men” (Headlam, Election by Lot). However, the idea that the lot was strictly a way of waiting on the Gods to determine the political is not well founded. References to the necessity of lot for democracy and critiques of the lot based on critiques of democracy, point to the essentially political, rather than religious, nature of the lot. Handlam concludes,
“the lot was religious in its origin, and that it was to the latest times throughout Greece used in the ritual of the temples with a clear acknowledgment that its decision gave a divine sanction ; but that at Athens owing to its constant use for political purposes it was secularised till almost all recollection of its religious origin had disappeared” (Headlam, Election by Lot).
With the decrease in religious significance, the political significance of equality, represented by the lot, grew to the greatest importance.

The use of the lot put civic equality at the heart of Athenian democracy. Because everyone (or rather, every free male), at random, could be chosen for a position of governing, trying to earn the position of power through skill or wealth was out of the picture.[1] Because of the random nature of the lot political preparedness had to be a universal and equal virtue, instead of a competition for power. Through the lot positions of political power became less powerful in and of themselves, and the whole system of political power became more powerful. The dispersal of power was, in part, a result of the focus the lot brought to equality rather than specialization in any role. Furthermore, the lot was held frequently enough so that no one held a position of power for very long. The job had to be such that anyone could fulfill the job when their name was drawn. In these ways equality both motivated and was created by the use of lot.

The lot was highly criticized by critiques of democracy, such as Socrates and Plato. For these critiques, choosing political leaders by lot was one of the many ways democracy failed to value specialization and recognize the natural inequality of people. For Socrates and Plato (and Aristotle), people are naturally unequal – not everyone is made to be a king, some are apt for jobs that others are not. This belief in natural inequality, tied to the belief in specialization of skills, makes them come out with a very different politics than the democracy of their fathers or even their own day.

Plato’s belief in inequality serves as a foundation for his understanding of specialization of social roles. In the Republic Plato states through the character of Socrates, “our several natures are not all alike but different. One man is naturally fitted for one task, and another for another” (Plato, Republic, 616). In this way, society is seen as a joining of different people with different skills in interdependence. It is not just that there are different tasks that need done in society, some manual, some political ect., but that people are born made for specific and different tasks and as such society is forced to form. This premise goes undisputed in the dialogue itself. Plato simply assumes that it is clear that people are made apt for different tasks. These tasks include political leadership and as such the idea of a lot choosing anyone at random for those positions is ridiculous to Plato. The lot does not recognize the natural inequality of people, but instead treats people who are very different as if they are the same.

From this inequality Plato argues, “The result, then, is that more things are produced, and better and more easily when one man performs one task according to his nature, at the right moment, and at leisure from other occupations” (Plato, Republic, 616). Each person should specialize in what they are good at and perform that task for themselves and for society. Through specializing, productivity, quality, and effort all improve.

Specialization is not just being born with a specific skill, the natural inequality. These skills also must be trained. Some tasks, such as farming, must be learned in one way. Others, such as king, must be learned in another way. The job of king is specifically learned through philosophy which takes a great deal of time and energy. Because of this, and because not everyone is made capable of philosophy in the first place, the specialized role of philosopher king is reserved for only an elite few. This division of labor is within the social as well as the political realms.[2] Within the political this specialization creates political roles much different than those which develop under the use of the lot. Only one, or in some cases a few, people can fulfill these roles, and in order to do so they must both be born apt for it as well as train for it. This means power becomes centralized in the positions which are most specialized. Because these positions can be held for longer and can only be done by the one who is made and trained for it, more power to enact that role is given to this leader than when the leader shifts frequently and can be filled by anybody.

The specialization of societal roles which Plato advocates strives for excellence over equality. When each position is done by someone who is trained carefully just for that position the level of excellence achieved will be much greater than if people who have no training in a position fill it. Specialization enables jobs to be done with excellence. The warrior is trained to be strong and brave, the farmer to know the seasons and needs of the crops, the king to know the nature of the world and the right means of getting there. Every job in society has its own skills and to become excellent at it those skills must be the full focus of the persons training. Doing more than one job at a time does not leave room for one to master any one of the jobs – (hence the phrase, “Jack of all trades, master of none”). For Plato, this means that designating jobs which individuals specialize in is the only way for a society to become excellent.

The effect of the use of lot in choosing people for political positions, and the shift to[3] specialization of societal role after Plato reveals the significance of the view of equality on the political situation. Imbedded in the lot is the idea that all citizens are equal and should share equally in the tasks of running a society. Imbedded in the idea of specialization is the idea that people are not equal and as such should not all share the tasks of running society. Subsequently the use of lot results in a more egalitarian society, and the implementation of specialized roles results in less equality. When the lot is used in a society people do not see the power invested in them as a result of their innate superiority or hard work, but as their duty to society. The power of a particular political role cannot grow to the point of vast inequalities because only limited power can be manifest when the jobs are designed so that anybody can fulfill it. If anybody can fulfill the job, than the one who is in that position could be replaced by anyone else at any time. As long as this replaceabilty exists, equality flourishes. Furthermore, because there are so many counter roles with the comparable political power (such as jurors, police…) it becomes extremely difficult for any one position to dominate the others. When the positions of political power are no longer replaceable with any citizen, inequality of power can arise. In societies where political positions are specialized, as Plato called for, power is centralized and thus not equally distributed within citizens. As one person becomes export in a task, others cannot engage in that task. When this is applied to political roles, those who specialize in the political hold the political power while those who specialize in other roles, such as farming, are left with no real political power. While everyone has their place in society, some of those places only have the power to maintain, not to change things. In this way, inequality emerges out of the ideology which is based on the idea of natural inequality, and equality emerges out of the system which is based on the idea of natural equality.

The inequality of specialization, however, also makes possible an excellence of performance that is impossible under the lot. While this excellence makes possible the centralization of power and inequality, it also makes possible excellent works of art, strong fighters, philosophy, and improvements in all these fields and more. Without specialization in a task it is hard pressed that anyone will know the task well enough to make improvements on its procedures. Only through specializing can a certain degree of excellence be obtained. Structures such as the lot do not enable anyone to develop a specialization in the roles which it applies to because there is no time. Specialization, and thus excellence, takes time that is not given with the use of lot. The possibility for excellence which emerges from a political system structured on specialization is one that arguably does not exist in early Athenian democracy.

The tension between these poles – specialization and lot, inequality and equality, excellence and equality – raises questions about the division of equalized or specialized jobs in society. If specialization creates inequality should any jobs require specialization? Yet, if some jobs can only be done if done by specialists, what jobs are these? Are these mutually exclusive? The answer to these questions will reflect the views of equality underlying them. The view of equality manifest through the use of the lot in Athenian democracy as equal civic political participation stands at odds with the understanding of equality as impossible/unnatural found in Plato’s treatment of specialization in society. It is within this tension that constructive approaches to equality as well as to the need for specialization can be developed.

Cartledge, Paul. Ancient Greek Political Thought, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2009.

Headlam, James. Election by Lot in Athens, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1891. Found at http://www.archive.org/stream/electionbylotata00headuoft/electionbylotata00headuoft_djvu.txt
Kagan, Donald. The Great Dialogue, The Free Press: New York, 1965.

Plato, Republic in The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Princeton
University Press, New Jersey, 1961.

[1] Though the tyrants obviously were able to do so through skill, and wealth and force combined.
[2] In so far as these are divided or united.
[3] Or back to…