Hobbes and Anarchy: Equality, Individualism, and the War of All Against All

For Cycles of American Political Thought
Hobbes and Anarchy: Equality, Individualism, and the War of All Against All
Terese Howard
2/26/10

One of the most readily made arguments against anarchism as a political system is that, if people are without an authority, they would have nothing holding them back from acting out their self interest which would lead them to killing and stealing and reeking mass havoc. People, left to their own devises, will be in a constant state of war. This is essentially the argument set forth by Thomas Hobbes in the mid seventeenth century in his works De Cive and Leviathan. Hobbes’ influence on politics throughout the west is vast. Hobbes was extremely influential on American political thought via his strong influence on John Locke, who is often considered the father of American political philosophy. Locke’s view of the individual, of equality, and of rights, among other ideas, would not have existed without Hobbes’ articulation of these ideas. From this chain of influence, Hobbes’ treatment of the state of nature as a war of all against all – which is labeled anarchy, becomes the foundational argument against anarchy and for State authority. Because of the universal and rational logic of the argument set forth by Hobbes, his state of nature is treated as a foundation of the logic of State authority without ever considering the history or material context of the societies in question. If human nature is universal and rational and it is such that anarchy equals the war of all against all, than nothing more need to be said to justify one’s critique of anarchism. Anarchist responses to this fundationalist critique of anarchy address both the method of the logic which leads to his conclusion, and the premises of his logic and conclusion itself – that is, that people are natural enemies who exist in perpetual war without a higher power to keep them in shape.

In this paper I will focus on explaining what the state of nature is for Hobbes and how his argument for the state of nature is made. I will than briefly consider some anarchist responses to this Hobbesian anarchy of all against all under the basic question, “Are humans at odds with each other in self interest?”.

The state of nature, in Hobbes, is socially manifest as the war of “every man, against every man” (Hobbes, Leviathan, 100). In the state of nature human action is in constant conflict with others and is without anything keeping each individual from manifesting that conflict in destructive ways. In moral terms “to this war of every man, against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust” (Hobbes, Leviathan, 101). It is the Sovereign, or the common power, that makes laws and it is laws that make justice and injustice. Without this sovereign law anything goes. The state of nature is such that every individual acts by their own interest against others thus in war – the opposite of peace.

As Hobbes scholar A.P. Martinich points out, the state of nature “has often been misunderstood to be the condition human beings were in when they were first created” (Martinich, Hobbes, 63). Hobbes does not trace the state of nature to Adam and Eve or any other primordial stage of human history. Hobbes explains, “It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world” (Hobbes, Leviathan, 101). There was never a time when the whole world was in this state of nature – not in the beginning or ever. He goes on however saying, “but there are many places, where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America…have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner” (Hobbes, Leviathan, 101). The existence and non-existence of the state of nature is not an evolutionary process. History does not move from the state of nature to the state of the State or other authorities. Societies can digress from government to a state of nature (anarchy) or develop from anarchy into governments. The point is that this state of nature is underpinning all societies but it only becomes manifest as such when there is no sovereign to keep the people in order. Most societies have some sort of sovereign, though often ones that are not strong enough or given proper authority which is a key concern of Hobbes, and the ones that don’t, the anarchies (his example being Native Americans) are seldom seen. Hobbes project throughout the Leviathan is not primarily to argue that humans left to their own without authority will be in a state of war against all, but to argue for a particular type of government lead by a Sovereign who has sufficient power and who the people consent to and act under the absolute jurisdiction of this power. Hobbes argument that the natural state is one of self interest and war is merely the foundation on which his theories of sovereign government lay. In this, the state of nature is not a concert historical stage which is leading to the correct form of government. Martinich describes the state of nature in Hobbes as a thought experiment (Martinich, Hobbes, 63). It is something one must deduce from logic and material, which is for Hobbes material logic since he is a materialist, through thought. While I argue the state of nature cannot entirely be a thought experiment, since Hobbes does make reference to examples of this state, it is clear that his method of reaching the state of nature is based more in logical thought, using specific material starting places, than on historical examples.

Hobbes’ argument that the state of nature is one of the war of all against all is based on material premises and logical deduction. The building rhetoric which Hobbes uses throughout the Leviathan is a perfect example of the logic of the state of nature itself. Each premise becomes a foundation for the next which in turn builds to the next. This is particularly true in his definitions of terms which once defined are then used with the whole baggage of that definition throughout the rest of the work.

The argument proper, that is the argument for his understanding of the state of nature, is most clearly set forth in chapter 13 of the Leviathan. Hobbes begins with the premise that all men are by nature equal. He states, “Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body, and mind; as that though there be quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable” (Hobbes, Leviathan, 98). This does not mean that all people are exactly the same in every way, or that all people have the same capabilities. Hobbes certainly believes that some people are better apt for intellectual activity or physical arts than others, but ultimately, in all significant ways, humans have equal capabilities. This is made most clear under the fact that even “the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself” (Hobbes, Leviathan, 98). This basic equality of strength in the ability to kill another is the fundamental equality of all. It is important to note that the strength of the body and the creativity of the mind are joined here when the physically weaker uses mind to maters matter. One way or another, through physical strength or through mental smarts, everyone can kill another and thus no one is naturally greater than any other. This basis of equality is a central fetcher of the liberal[1] individualist philosophy which streams from Hobbes into America. People are treated as individual entities which can be described by universal, equitable qualities.

Because of the natural equality of humans, in the second premise, Hobbes argues that diffidence proceeds. Everyone becomes enemies in equality. Hobbes explains, “From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in attaining of our ends” (Hobbes, Leviathan, 98). Since everyone is equal everyone has equal hope of being the one to get what they want. The conflict here comes in that “if two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies” (Hobbes, Leviathan, 98). If people were not equal and they knew that someone else was capable of getting things that they were not they would not see themselves at odds with the others because they could not gain the same things. But as equals, people are at odds because they both want the same things and have the capacity of getting the same things. Crucial to this logic is that assumption, hinted at in the statement “which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy,” (98) that these things are exclusive – that is, they can only be had by one person. This point will be discussed more latter, but for now it must be noted that Hobbes basis the equality of conflict on the exclusivity of desires. In diffidence people always must be afraid of everyone. Every other person is a potential threat to one’s desires and one can never tell who is going to be a threat and who is not. In this way, Hobbes takes “Stranger Danger” to its extreme.

It is a natural step for Hobbes to move from this state of diffidence to the state of war of all against all. Since everyone is enemies with everyone else in conflict for exclusive ends, and everyone has the capability to kill another, war is quick to ensue. This war “consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known” (Hobbes, Leviathan, 100). The state of nature is thus manifest not necessarily as battle but as tension, fear, and felt conflict between all people as individuals. Even if an individual turns to others as allies to help fight another, that individual cannot trust even those allies. Anyone could potentially be an enemy. This implicit animosity to all others is the state of nature. This state comes to fruition when there is no authority to keep the people in awe. Without absolute sovereign law people’s exclusive self interests will have full reign over themselves and society as a whole will be a state of war. It is only an absolute power that can keep people from acting out this state of nature.

Why would people consent to this absolute power? Hobbes’ fourth premise to the state of nature is that people seek peace. It is because people desire peace, they know peace to be a better state of being than war, that they will turn to an absolute power to get them out of the state of war. This desire for peace is directly tied to the individual’s drive for life over death. Otherwise put, “The passions that incline men to peace, are fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living” (Hobbes Leviathan, 102). Since death is more likely under the state of nature – the war of all against all – people realize that a sovereign power is needed to keep them from existing, and dying, in this state of nature. Without the desire for peace, or life, nothing would drive people to get out of the state of nature.

The consent which the people give to the sovereign is manifest in giving up their natural rights to the sovereign. Not only is Hobbes the father of liberal equality, he is also the father of the liberal notion of rights as is based on equal individuals with a universal human nature. A critical part of the state of nature is that in this natural state everyone has the right to everything needed for self preservation. The right here is naturally endowed in a person by their very nature as a material body with material needs, including the need to be protected from death. Hobbes states, “The right of nature…is the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own judgment, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto” (Hobbes, Leviathan, 103). The natural right to life here does not just mean a right to food and shelter, it means a right to do whatever one believes is needed to preserve one’s life, even if that belief is not true. In the state of nature people have the right to anything, including the life of another, they perceive as standing in the way of their preservation. But the right of all to all, that is the state of nature, is ultimately not conducive to life. When everyone has the right to everything, everyone is in conflict as enemies, and thus the state of war takes over society. From this state of things people realize that it is better to give up some of their rights to a sovereign power who will create and enforce laws that limit everyone’s rights such that everyone can live in peace.

After summarizing Hobbes treatment of the state of nature the question must ask whether this really is the natural state of anarchic society. Do humans living in anarchy live in a state of implicit self interest and war? Are people naturally at odds with each other in such a way that, without a higher power to keep them in awe, they kill and steal and lie in any way they see fit to get what they want? I will not attempt here to give a thorough treatment of anarchist critiques of Hobbes’ state of nature. The point of this paper is more to understand Hobbes’s treatment of anarchy than to critique it. However, for the sack of putting Hobbes’ ideas in a broader perspective I will set forth two anarchist[2] critiques of Hobbes’ state of nature as specifically articulated by Hobbes scholar Charles Landesman in his essay Reflections on Hobbes: Anarchy and Human Nature.

In Hobbes’ state of nature people learn to distrust one another through competition. Humans’ natural state of fear of all others, a fear based on the idea that humans are bound to look after their own self interest to the point of harming others, lays grounds for Hobbes’ extreme individualism. This individualist antagonism sees every individual at odds in fear of every other individual. Yet, as Landesman points out, this does not take into consideration the fact that without natural trust of others, people would die. Landesman argues, “The very young child’s dependence upon others and need for the company of others defeats the hypothesis of innate and universal distrust. Human survival would be threatened if diffidence were instinctual. Imagine the infant fleeing from its mother’s breast” (Landesman, Reflections on Hobbes, 144). The point here is not that interdependence and trust is more natural than competition and distrust. Both trust and distrust can be seen as natural. The point is that this state of competition cannot be treated as a foundation for a natural state of distrust because competition does not take place in isolation from interdependence and thus trust. The state of nature, accordingly, should not be considered one of distrust, but of trust – which is unlearned, combined with distrust – which is learned from competition. This state of trust de-individualize the society as people are not seen as independent entities at odds with every other independent person, but as interdependent beings. The competition that does exist must exist in this the midst of the natural trust of interdependence.

The second critique of Hobbes state of nature flows directly from this one. It can be state as simply as “we could share the apple.” This critique addresses Hobbes assumption of the exclusivity of human needs and desires. When Hobbes states, “if two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies” (Hobbes, Leviathan, 98), he is basing the animosity of humanity on the assumption that most things people want cannot be shared. Yet, as Landesman argues, “Not all goods are exclusive. Some can be jointly enjoyed….Goods are not intrinsically exclusive or nonexclusive. How they are to be classified depends on how we slice them up” (Landesman, Reflections of Hobbes, 145). An apple, for example, that two people desire can be cut in half and shared. In fact many, if not most, things in life can be split up or mutually shared. It is only in true scarcity that survival goods such as food become exclusive goods. Yet this kind of scarcity is not the case in most societies today or even in the long past. And where there is genuine scarcity such that all cannot survive on the amount of food at hand, it is natural for competition to ensue and some to live and some to die. Yet the existence of this state of competition in a state of scarcity does not necessarily mean that the state of competition will exist when scarcity does not. Competition should not be the basis of the argument for the state of nature as fear and enemies, but instead scarcity should, as it is scarcity that makes competition. And since scarcity is not an eternal and universal state it cannot be taken as the universal natural state. In this way, Hobbes belief that people are naturally enemies is called into question and a more mutually dependant, less competitive, state of nature comes to play.

No matter whether one buys Hobbes self driven, individualist, war of all against all as the state of nature or not, in the face of these critiques (critiques which ultimately lay room for anarchism), one is forced to question the basic component of the individual which Hobbes’ arguments are all based on, as well as questioning the natural animosity that Hobbes claims as natural. It is these questions that must be addressed in order to viably argue for the possibility of a healthy, happy anarchy, or against the possibility of such an anarchic society.

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, Collier Books: New York, 1962.
Landesman, Charles. “Reflections on Hobbes: Anarchy and Human Nature” in The Causes of Quarrel:
essays of Peace, War and Thomas Hobbes, ed. Peter Caws, Beacon Press: Boston, 1989. Martinich, A.P. Hobbes, Routledge: New York, 2005.

[1] Here meaning the modernist liberalism, not what is looked at as liberalism today.
[2] Or pro-anarchist since it is unclear whether the author is coming specifically from an anarchist perspective or just a defense of anarchy.